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Most economists using a standard life cycle analysis would probably
agree that the primary objective of a pension system is to provide a
standard of living in retirement comparable to that enjoyed during the
working years. There is, nevertheless, considerable disagreement as to
how that objective can best be achieved. Broadly, the disagreements are
on the appropriate roles for private pension plans and a public pension
plan in the pension system and on whether or not the pension system
should also be used for redistribution or transfers. The most elegant
approach to the problem would undoubtedly be to solve for the optimal overall
pension system with a simultaneous determination of the optimal forms for
both the public and private parts. However, the analysis here ismore
limited in its scope because its focus is principally on the public part
of the system and because it examines only one of the many possible
functions that such a system might serve in any real—world implementation.
That is, the sole intent of the system is assumed to be the retirement
objective, and not, for example, to also provide for a redistribution
of wealth. The paper should thus be viewed as only a prologue to a more
complete functional analysis of the overall pension system including
the important issue of the degree of integration between private and
public pension plans.
Analysis of the public part of the system is a natural starting
place because whatever form the overall pension system takes, it will—2—
surely include a significant public pension plan coniponent. As will be
discussed, there are a number of thecretical arguments to support such
a component as part of an optimal system. Moreover, as a practical
matter independent of any theoretical welfare arurnents that economists
might provide to the contrary, the public pension system in the United
States, after almost half a century of operating experience, is not
going to be eliminated, especially when a significant fraction of the
population is not covered by any private pension plan. The current
problems with Social Security do however, present the possibility for
major changes in the structure of the public pension system. It would
therefore seem to be somewhat difficult to analyze the optima]. design
of private pension plans and the associated issue of integration until
the structure of the public system is more firmly established.
In theory, the characteristic differences between a public and a
private pension system are that participation in a public system is
mandatory and that the public system cannot be "custom tailored" to
meet the specific preferences of each individual participant. Such a
clear distinction is valid if the private system were solely laisse faire
individual saving. However, as the private system has in fact evolved,
the operational significance of this distinction, at least at the level
of analysis presented here, is less clear. Participation in most
existing private pension plans is virtually mandatory. In a typical
defined—contribution plan, individual choice is quite limited as to the
amounts contributed and where the funds are invested, and in defined—
benefit plans, there is typically no choice at all. The analysis—3.--
presented here in the context of a public system is therefore readily
adaptable to an "organized" private pension system.
The arguments for a public pension system with mandatory
participation fall into two basic categories: externalities and
private market "failure" An important example of the former is the
utility externality that other people's welfare is one of the arguments
of individual utility functions. That is, people care about others and
among other things, will not let them starve in retirement. From this,
we get a classical example of the "free—rider" problem which cannot be
solved by the private markets, but can be solved by an appropriately
designed mandatory public pension system. A second example is the
possibility of economies of scale in information costs. Virtually
everyone faces the decision problem of how much to save for retirement
and what to invest those savings in during their working years. The
marginal cost of obtaining the education and gathering the necessary
data to make informed decisions as well as the time spent implementing
these decisions will, of course, vary substantially across individuals
as a function of their prior education and their wealth. Presumably,
a professor of finance by virtue of his training would have a lower
marginal cost than, a professor of physics. The cost of buying the
service of informed decisions will be lower (as a percentage of wealth)
for those who are wealthy than for those of modest means. While this
cost could be reduced by "pooling," this solution almost assumes away
the problem because such an undertaking requires adequate information
and opportunity to form a cohesive group.—4.-
If therefore, a pension plan were designed which reasonably
approximates the plan which most individuals would choose if they were
informed, then by making participation in the plan mandatory, the
resources used in individual education and data gathering would be
saved and th maximuni benefits of pooling to reduce operating costs
could be achieved. The benefits of such mandatory participation must,
of course, he compared to the cost in terms of loss in individual
freedom of choice. As already noied, existing private pension plans
permit little choice. Although this data point favors the hypothesis
that the benefits outweigh the costs, it is hardly a sufficient basis
for a policy decision.
The second basiccategory of arguments for a public pension plan
is that the efficiency of risk—bearing can e improved. That is, the
government can provide diversification possibilities which are not
available in the private markets, and thereby, issue finanical
instruments which the private sector cannot. One example would be
intergenerational risk sharing which cannot be covered by private
markets (cf. Fischer (1982)). Another would be to use either taxes
and transfers (cf. Nerton (1981)) or taxes and the issue of securities
within the pension system to provide diversification of some of the
risks of assets which are not tradeable (as is the case for much of
human capital).
With these general reasons for a public pension plan as background,
the consumption—indexed plan to be studied is briefly summarized before
turning to a formal analysis in the context of a simple intertemporal—5—
equilibrium model in Section II. This is then followed in Section III,
by a discussion of the merits and feasibility of such plans.
The plan is a mandatory fully—funded savings plan of the "defined
contribution" type where required contributions by each member of the
plan are a fixed proportion of his consumption. As with current private
defined—contribution plans, each member has an individual account which
is credited with his contributions (less any deduction for operating
expenses of the plan).
Contributions and earnings in each member's account are invested in
"aggregate per capita consumption—indexed life annuities" where these
are defined to be an instrument which pays a constant fraction of
aggregate per capita consumption to its holder (the member) each period
andsuch payments begin at a prespecified commencement date (the
date at which the member begins to receive his benefits) and continue
until the member dies. If the member dies before the commencement date,
the annuity is worthless. Benefits, therefore, are in the form of a
life annuity indexed to aggregate per capita consumption.
The commencement date for benefits is at a specified age (e.g., age
60), independent of whether or not the recipient has retired. This
provision is to avoid possibly undesirable distortions of the decision
to retire. However, provision could be made for delaying the receipt of
benefits to a later age. Contributions are mandatory from some
statuatory beginning age (e.g., age 21) until the commencement date.
One way to administer such a plan would be to create a public
corporation which would be responsible for issuing the indexed—6—
life—annuities to plan members where these annuities wouldconstitute
itssenior liabilities. The US government iou]d he the residual
liability or equityholder of the corporation and would have unlimited
liability. The assets of the corpcrtion come from inmber contributions
and are invested in the broadest available portfolio of marketable
securities.
The number of units of life annuities issued to an account is on
a "mark—to—market" basis at the time each contribution is received.
That is,thevalue of a unit of a life annuity issued is determined by
current market prices and mortality tables. To make this possible, it
would be necessary for the government to issue aggregate per capita
consumption—indexed bonds of various maturities.
To prevent attempts to circumvent mandatory participation in the
plan, retirement benefits are assumed to be neither assignable nor
attachable. For similar reasons, integration of private pension plans
with the public plan are permitted, but only to the extent that the combined
benefits received by the individual arc no less than he would have
received from the public plan alone.—7—
II. A Simple Intertemporal Equilibrium Model
In this section, a continuous—time consumption choice model of the
type presented in Merton (1971) and (1973) is used to analyze the
system of mandatory saving and consumption—linked retirement benefits.
Consider an economy where all people have the same lifetime utility
of consumption which is given for a person born at time t0 by





where c(t;T) is consumption at time t of a person of age TandE
is the conditional expectation operator conditional on knowing all
relevant information available as of time t. Each person has an uncertain
lifetime where denotes the random variable age of death, and the
probability that the person will die between Iandi+dT, conditional
on being alive at age Iisgiven by X(T)dT where ACt) >0.Each
person acts so as to maximize (1) subject to hisinitial wealth w0
If the event of death is independent of other economic variables,
then along the lines of the proof of Theorem VI in NertOn (1971, p. 400),






where f(-r;T')isthe probability that the person will be alive at age T





Byassumption, each person has no bequest function. Hence, it will
be optimal for each person to enter into a life annuity contract where
his wealth goes to the issuer if he dies and he receives a payment if he
lives. One such arrangement would be a series of "short—term" contracts
where at age T,heagrees to bequeath his wealth, w(t;T), to the issuer
if he dies between TandT+di and the issuer agrees to pay him a
"dividend" D dt if he lives. If there are a large enough number of
people in the economy to diversify away completely the risk of
individual deaths and if the contracts (like futures contracts) require
no side payments between issuer and purchaser, then the competitive
equilibrium "dividend" will be X(T)w(t;T)dt.
In addition to the annuity contract, the person will choose an
optimal portfolio allocation of his wealth. As shown for example in
Nerton (1971), the fractions of his optimal portfolio allocated to the
available investments are independent of his wealth or age because his—9—
utility function is of the isoeltic form. Therefore, all investors in
the economy will hold identical portfolios (except for scale). Heice,
without loss of generality, I assume that all people invest in a single
security, and the rate of return on this security, dM/M, is assumed to
follow an Ito Process given by
(4) 4=ct+z
where the instantaneous expected rate of returncr., and the instantaneous
variance of the return o2, are constants over time. it follows from (4)
that the return on this security is lognormally distributed. Moreover,
as a necessary condition for equilibrium, this security must be a
"market portfolio," i.e., a portfolio which contains all available
investments and holds them in proportion to their market values.
The accumulation equation for the wealth of a person of age Tat
time t can, therefore, be written as
dw(t;T)=[(X(T)-fcz)w(t;T)-c(t;T))dt-fcTw(t;T)dz
(5a)
if he does not die between t ond t + dt, and as
(5b) dw(t;T) =— w(t;T)
if he dies between t and t+ dt.
Alongth2 lines of the derivation in Merton(1971,p. 390), theoptimal
consumptiondemand for a person of age t a time t can be written as
(6a) c(t;T) =a(T)w(t;T)
where a(T) is a solution to the differential equation(6b)
—i o—
=â(r)
a(-t) + X(T)+ p
a (T)
with pEp—yctj/(l — y)+
is a function of both wealth
consume (out of wealth) will
Similarly, the distribution
t + s given his wealth at
at time t and the return
t + s but also on his age
Using It&'s Lemma, we
-yo212 y inspection, optimal consumption
and age, and the marginal propensity to
be an increasing function of age if 3(T)
ofa person's wealth who is alive at time
time t, will not only depend upon his wcalth
experience on his portfolio between t and
at time t






Conditional upon the person not dying between t and dt, we have by
substitution from (5) and (6) that (7) can be rewritten as
(8)
and of course, if he dies then dc(t;T)/c(t;-r) =-1.By inspection of
(8), the dynamic path of a person's optimal lifetime consumption follows
a Narkov process, independent of either his wealth or his age (except
for the "stopping point"). That is, given his consumption at time t,
c(t;T), his concumption (if alive) at time t + s has a lognormal
distribution which can be represented by
(9) c(t + s;T + s) =c(t;T)exp[(ct—p)s+ c}—ii—
where c is a standard normal random variable. Thus, unlike the
percentage change in wealth which is age dependent, the percentage
change in consumption is the same for all people alive. It follows,
therefore, that
(10) c(t + s;T + s) c(t + s;T' s)
c(t;T) c(t;T')
for ell people alive at tine t + s and T,T' > 0.
Armed with (8) and (10), we can now proceed to derive the dynamic
properties of aggregate per capita consumption, C(t). If L(t;r)
denotes the number of people of age T in the economy at time t,
then the total population size, L(t), equals
fL(t;T)dT. Therefore,
aggregate per capita consumption is equal to
(11) C(t) =fL(t;T)c(t;T)dT/L(t)
0
If the birthrate at time t i given by b(t), then the change in
aggregate per capita consumption is given by
(12) dc(t) =fL(t;T)dc(t;T)dT/L(t) -H(t)C(t)dt
0
where• 11(t){b(t)[C(t) -c(t;0)] A(T)L(t;T)[C(t) -
c(t;T))dT/L(t)}/C(t).
The properties of 11(t) are, of course, dependent upon demographic
assumptions. However, they also depend upon the distribution of
consumption per capita. If, for example, the distribution of per capita—1 2-
consuaption were uniform [i.e., c(t;T)C(t), for all T}, then




H(t) = X(T)L(t;T)[c(t;0)—c(t;T)]dT/[L(t)C(t)],and thesignof H
will depend primarily on the distribution of per capita consumption
between the very young and the 'ery old (where the marginal death rate,
X(T), is largest). If that distribution is approximately equal
[c(t; 0)c(t;T) for large T] and the population is growing, then the
sign of H(t) will equal the sign of [C(t) —c(t;0)],the difference
between the general population per capita consumption and per capita
consumption of the very young.
Even without taking into account the interaction between population
growth and economic conditions, the analysis of stochastic demographic
models is formidable. And, while the death rate (at least in the
shortrun) may be exogeneous, the birth rate is surely affected by economic
conditions. Therefore, although explicit consideration of the process
for H(t) is important for many issues in this paper, no such analysis
will be undertaken here. Instead, I simply postulate that H(t) =O.--'







A comparison of (8) with (13) shows that (except for scale), each
person's optimal consumption follows a stochastic process identical to
the one for aggregate per capita consumption. That is, conditional on
being alive at timet + dt, dc(t;T)/c(t;T) =dC(t)/C(t),independent
of the person's age T. Therefore, we have for person jthat his
consumption (if he is alive) at time t can be written as
(14) c.(t) =.C(t)
3 J
where ,.Ec(t.;O)/C(t ) and ris his birth date.
J J j j
Consider now a mandatory saving and retirement plan where
beginning at age T0, each person must contribute at rate times his
consumption until at age T1, the person begins to receive his life
annuity retirement benefits. During the accumulation period of
length TaT1 —T0,
each person's contribution is invested in a per
capita aggregate consumption—linked life annuity contract matched to his
age at the time of the contribution.
Let A(t,T;T1) denote the equilibrium price at time t of a life
annuity contract which begins its payments at age T1 and the purchaser
is currently age T. The promised stream of payments is equal to C(s)
per unit time from time s =t+ T1 —Tuntil the purchaser dies. Let
P(t;T) denote the equilibrium price at timet of a consumption—linked—1 "i—
purediscount bond of maturity T which pays $C(ti) at time t + T.
If, as has been assumed, indivda1 death risk can be diversified away,
then the competitive equilibrium price for A can be written as
(15) A(t,T;T1) f(s + T1;T)P(t;s + T1 —T)ds
where, as previously defined, f(T;T') is the probability of being
alive at age T conditional on being alive at age T'.
For the economy of this section, an explicit fo-rrnula for the P(t;T)
can be derived by competitive arbitrage. From (13),
t+T
C(t + T) =C(t)exp —p+ a2)T + a f
dz(s)]
Therefore, the
realized return on the discount bond between t and+ T is
t+r
C(t + T)/p(t;T) =C(t)eT/P(t;T)exp [(
-a) + of
dz(s)]
However, from (4),the return per dollar from investing in the market
portfolio between t and t + T is exp [(ci —- 04)T+ 0f dz(s)]
Therefore, to avoid arbitrage, P(t;t) must satisfy
(16) P(t;t) =C(t)eT
It follows from (.16), that the instantaneous rate of return on the bond,
dP/P dt + adz, is the same as on the market. Substituting for P






Moreover, it is straightforward to show that for T < T1
(18) [a + ?(T)]dt + cdz
if the owner of the contract is alive at t + dt and dA/A =—l
if the owner dies between t and tdt.
Let V(t;T) denote the value of the accumulated retirement account
for a person of age T at. time t. Under this retirement plan
with accumulations in units of a consumption—linked life annuity, the
value can be expressed as
(19) V(t;T) =N(T)A(t,T;T1)
where N(T) equals the number of units accumulated at age T. By
Ito's Lemma, dVN(t)dA + I(T)Adt if the person lives to time t + dt
and dV—v if he dies between t and t + dt. Under the mandatory
saving plan, I(T)A(t,T;T1) =cSc(t;T)and N(T0) =0.From (14),
c(t;T)C(t), and if the retirement plan is designed to provide
fraction r (0 <<1)of the person's optimal retirement period
consumption, then cSshould be chosen so that at retirement, the number
of units accumulated, N(T1), equals r.
If the retirement plan is fully—funded and actuarially fair, then
at age T0, the present value of the future contributions by the person
should be equal to the present value of the annuity payments to be
receivedir retirement. Under the terms of the mandatory saving plan,—16—
the person will contribute at the rate ,c(t;T)3C(t)(as long as
heisalive) until he reaches T1 Therefore,at ageT0 ,the





If the plan is to provide N(T1) r units in retirement, then the
present value of these retirement benefits at age T0is
nM(t;T0;T1) Therefore, must be chosen such that
F(t; T0) =A(t,T0;T1)












By inspection of (22), the required contribution fractiondoes not—17—
depend upon endowments or the individual contributor's age. It does,
of course, depend upon the statuatory retirement age T1 ,the
accumulation period Ta, and the target fraction of retirement period
consumption provided by the plan, r .Therefore, can be kept
constant over time, and still meet the objectives of the plan. The
only changes required would be in response to large cumulative changes
in the mortality tables f or1, and these would probably be infrequent.
Moreover, because the plan is fully—funded and accumulations earn a
fair market return, such changes in f or p that might occur will
cause no significant distortions even if were not adjusted over time.
To provide a crude estimate of the magnitude of ,Iassume the
following: (i) the accumulation period Ta =45years;(ii) during the
accumulation period, the mortality rate is a constant, I ,equalto
.0138 per year; (iii) during the retirement period, the mortality rate
is a constant, A ,equalto .0666 per year and that, in no event, will
anyone live longer than thirty years after retirement. The average
rate of growth of aggregate per capita real consumption from 1947 to
1981 is approximately two percent per year. If the expected real rate
of return on all wealth in the economy, a ,iStaken to be four percent,
then from (13), we derive an estimate forp of two percent.
Substituting these numbers into (22), we have that
(23) .10 ri
That is, to provide for all of retirement consumption (r =1)would
require about a ten percent contribution rate. While such a rate may
scam large (requiring contrIbutions of the order of $200 billion in 1981),—18—
tenpercent is a common contributioa rate (on income) in mn c::istiug
private defined—contribution plan3, and the current (iiaximum)
contributionrate for Keogh Plans is fifteen percent. To provide
further perspective, I would also note that the combined omp1oye—
employercontributions toSocial Security infourthquarter 1981 as
at an annual rate of $245billion.It is,of course, unlikely that a
public pension plan would be expected to provide for all retirement
consumption and therefore, the necessary contribution rate would he
considerably less than ten percent.—19—
III. On the Merits and Feasibility of a Consumption—
Indexed Public Plan
While the analysis in the previous section demonstrates a consumption—
indexed public retirement plan, it is presented within the context of a
model where such plans crc redundant. That is, with perfect markets for
both assets and annuities, no utility externalities, and rational and
informed people, there is, of course, no need for such public intervention.
From this base, however, imperfections can be introduced to provide at
least a qualitative analysis of the benefits of the plan for comparison
with alternative plans if, and when, such intervention were deemed appropriate.
For example, a significant feature of this plan is that
contributions be invested in aggregate consumption—linked life annuities.
If important assets within the economy such as human capital and real
estate are either nontradeable or not available in divisible lots, then
even a broad—based portfolio of tradeable assets will not provide a
fully—efficient diversified portfolio. However, an individual's
consumption is likely to be strongly correlated with his wealth (or
permanent income) whether that wealth is tradeable or not, and
therefore, a security whose return is perfectly—correlated with
aggregate par capita consumption is likely to represent a better—
diversified holding than a portfolio containing only marketable
securities. Moreover, even when all securities are traded, Breeden
(1979) has shown that all efficient portfolios will be perfectly—
correlated with aggregate consumption.
If there are systematic differences among large segments of the
population as to the types of nontradeable assets they hold, then it—20-
is possible to improve diversification efficiency still further.An
example would be that the young in the economy are forced tohold too
large a fraction of their wealth in human capitalbecause ft is not
tradeable while the old huld tou small a fraction in human capital
because they cannot buy it. As I have shown elsewhere (1981),risk—
bearing can be improved by a system that taxes wagesand pays wage—
linked retirement benefits. However, as that analysis amply demonstrates,
such further diversification gains are earned at the expense of having a
"pay-as—you-go" retirement system with a risk of significantdistortions
from the associated taxes and transfers.
Diamond (1977) has suggested that one reason for a Social Security
system is the absence in the private marketsof "real" or "indexed"
investments by which people of normal means can accumulate savingsfor
retirement. However, "real" fixed—income bonds would only protectsuch
savers against the uncertainties of inflation. Theywould not protect
the saver against the risk of real increases in the standardof living.
As shown in Table 1, real per capita consumption in the UnitedStates
has increased at an average rate of 1.96 percent per year from1947 to
1981. Moreover, the annual standard deviation of that growth rateis
1.68 percent. Hence, if a person's sense of "how well off heis"
depends not only on the absolute level of his consumption,but also on
its level relative to those around him, then the risk in utility—terms
of a price—level—linked investment can be considerable, especially over
a long accumulation period. A consumption—linkedinvestment protects
against both inflation and real changes in thestandard of living. It—21—
TABLE1
Lev1s and Growth Rates
2/











(billions/1972 $) (millions) (thousands/1972 $)
Level %Change Lee1 Change LevelZ(Thnge Year
1947 305.8 ——— 103.4 ——— 2.957 ———
1948 312.2 2.1 104.5 1.1 2.987 1.0
1949 319.3 2.3 105.6 1.0 3.023 1.2
1950 337.3 5.6 106.6 1.0 3.163 4.6
1951 341.6 1.3 107.7 1.0 3.171 0.3
1952 350.1 2.5 108.8 1.0 3.217 1.5
1953 363.4 3.8 110.6 1.6 3.286 2.1
1954 370.0 1.8 111.7 1.0 3.313 0.8
1955 394.1 6.5 112.7 1.0 3.496 5.5
1956 405.4 2.9 113.8 1.0 3.562 1.9
1957 413.8 2.1 115.1 1.1 3.596 1.0
1958 418.0 1.0 116.4 1.1 3.592 —0.1
1959 440.4 5.4 117.9 1.3 3.736 4.0
1960 452.0 2.6 119.8 1.6 3.774 1.0
1961 461.4 2.1 121.3 1.3 3.802 0.7
1962 482.0 4.5 123.0 1.3 3.919 3.1
1963 500.5 3.8 125.2 1.8 3.999 2.0
1964 528.0 5.5 127.2 1.7 4.150 3.8
1965 557.5 5.6 129.2 1.6 4.314 3.9
1966 585.7 5.1 131.2 1.5 4.465 3.5
1967 602.7 2.9 133.3 1.6 4.521 1.3
1968 634.4 5.3 135.6 1.7 4.680 3.5
1969 657.9 3.7 137.8 1.7 4.773 2.0
1970 672.1 2.2 140.2 1.7 4.794 '0.5
1971 696.8 3.7 142.6 1.7 4.887 1.9
1972 737.1 5.8 145.8 2.2 5.056 3.5
1973 768.5 4.3 148.2 1.7 5.183 2.5
1974 763.6 —0.6 150.8 1.7 5.063 —2.3
1975 780.2 2.2 153.4 1.7 5.084 0.4
1976 823.7 5.6 156.0 1.7 5.279 3.8
1977 863.9 4.9 158.6 1.6 5.448 3.2
1978 904.8 4.7 161.1 1.6 5.618 3.1
1979 930.9 2.9 163.6 1.6 5.689 1.3
1980 935.1 0.5 166.2 1.6 5.625 -1.1
1981 958.9 2.5 168.6 1.4 5.688 1.1—22--
hasthe further practical advantage of avoiding the index problem
because it is not necessary to distinguish between nominal andreal
changes.
In another context, Fischer (1982) argues that the government
should issue wage—income—linked bonds. hi1e it is likely that such
bonds would be a superior to price—level—linked bonds for most saving
plans, at least in theory, they may not be as efficicnt as consumption—
linked bonds. One reason is that changes in wage income capture the
returns to only one segment (albeit an important one) of national
wealth while consumption changes depend upon all segments. A second
reason is that wage income is more likely to have a significanttransient
component than is consumption since by the Life Cycle Hypothesis,
consumption depends upon permanent income or wealth. How important
the difference would be between wage—income and consumption linked
bonds is, of course, an empirical matter, and one that warrants further
study.
There are relatively limited opportunities in existing private
markets to accumulate savings in life annuities and none wrere those
savings are invested in consumption—linked investments. In theabsence
of such instiuments, the individual may be forced to save too much
relative to his bequest motive. By investing contributions in life
annuities, the proposed plan permits a person to accumulate adequate
amounts for retirement with smaller contributions. The additional
available funds from this reduced contribution rate can be used either
for more current consumption or to purchase life insurance or other—23—
saving instruments to meet heuest motives. Thiafeatureis esuecially
important in a mandatory saving plan because, for the sametargetlevel
of retirement benefits, it reduces the welfare—loss of the plan to those
inpoorhealth or those who have no bequest motive.
A second significant feature of tite pl.an is that retiiement benefits
are linked to aggregate per capita consumption. The arguments in favor
of consumption—linked benefits are essentially the same as those given
for consumption—linked accumulations. So, for example, while a number of
people including Diamond (1977), have argued for real or price—indexed
fixed annuities for retirement benefits, per capita consumption—linked
benefits are likely to dominate such annuities because they protect the
retiree against both the uncertainties in the inflation rate and changes
in the standard of living.
The success of a consumption—indexed plan (whether public or
private) depends critically on the existence of per capita aggregate
consumption—linked bonds. In their absence, administrators of the plan
'ould be required to estimate the "fair market value't of such bonds in
order to determine how many units to credit each account with during
the accumulation period and to determine how much to pay in benefits
during retirement.I need hardly mention the extreme difficulties
associated with making these appraisals especially when such instruments
have never traded. Moreover, for a public plan, there would likely be
times when strong political pressure would be brought to bear on the
administrators to "adjusc" their appraisals. Even if such pressure were
in fact resisted, the mere prospect of a potential "conflict of interest"
could taint the entiie sysLem.—2—
Inthcory, the private sector could create a market for per capita
aggregate consumption—linkedbonds and provide cocsumption—linked life
annuities through financialintermediaries.Some might indeed argue
thatthe fact that such instrune.nts have notbeen created is strong
evidencein favor of the hvpothes that there is no need for them.
However, if this hypothesis is correct, then there must already exist
close surrogates for these instruments in the market since, as suggested
forexample by Breeden's (1979) analysis, there is a strong theoretical
foundation for the belief that an aggregate consumption—linked security
would he widely demanded. I know of no such combination of available
securities.
There is, of course, the alternative hypothesis that the nonexistence
of such instruments is an example of private market "failure." That is,
even thcugh there would be a demand for these instruments, there is
insufficient incentive for investment bankers, for example, to undertake
the costs of educating both purchasers and issuers especially when the
latter have no assets which are naturally matched to this type of
liability. Similarly in the absence of a "thick" market for consumption—
linked bonds, financial intcrmediaries would likely be reluctant to
issue such annuity liabilities because there is no asset which can be
purchased to hedge these liabilities. Of course, some intermediaries
might be induced to take some limited amount of risk without being
hedged, but this limited amount would surely be inadequate for the
scale required for pension plans. On the other hand, it appears that
the government is a "natural" intermediary to issue consumptionlinked
bonds because it has available the power to tax expenditures. That is,—25—
thegovcrnmenL could institute a cOflsuiptiOfl tax proportion to the
number of consumption—linked'ooctdsoutstanding ajidthe revenues from
the tax wo'ild exactly match the required liability payments. Moreover,
there appears to be no significant social cost to the government
issuingconsumption-iinked bonds mid there may be social benefits from
the government financing the deficit in thisform. Vhile the principal
reason for discussing the creation of such bonds here is their essential
role in pension plans, I believe that, independent of pension plans,
consumption—linked bonds would be an ideal investment instrument f or
private saving generally.Ifthis belief is correct and if the government
didissuesuch bonds, then it is likely that private financial inter-
mediaries would introduce consumption—linked annuities and corporations
would issue consumption—linked liabilities. The existence of such
private—sector financial instruInerts wbuld serve to make consumption—
indexed pension plans more efficient by providing better pricing
information for the plans' annuities and by providing a broader—base
of securities in which to invest the plans' assets.
Even if the private sector could efficiently provide consumption—
linked bonds and life annuities, as noted in the Introduction, private
pension plans alone cannot handle either information cost or utility
externalities. While it is of course difficult to measure how other
people's welfare enter into an individual's utility function, I believe
that it is likely to do so in a relative fashion. That is, we are less
inclined to "worry about" or make transfers to those who have a
relatively high tandard of living, and among those with the same
current standard of living, we are more sympathetic towards those whohave fal3en on "hard times" and expericuced a decline from tieir
historical standard of living. If this 3sscssment is correct, then
a public plan along the lines discussed here appears to efficiently
hndlc this utility externality for people in rotl ement. By requlring
contributions proportional to individual consumption during his working
yearsand investing these contributions in percapita consumption—linked
lifeannuities, such a plan ensures an accumulated amount sufficient to
support a retirement consumption path for the individual at a level
(relative to aggregate per capita consumption) similar to that which he
enjoyed during the working phase of his life. Linking benefits to per
capita aggregate consumption provides for a continuation of this standard
of living throughout the retirement years. Thus, a plan with these
features meets the objective of ensuring an appropriate relative standard
of living in retirement for everyone and it handles the "free—rider"
prob lenm.
These features do not, of course, solve the redistribution problem
for those people whose relative standard of living is too low during
their work years. However, a reasonable argument can be made that it is
more efficient to make the necessary transfers by other more—direct
means atthe time (during the working years) when they areneeded instead
of attempting to do so indirectly by redistributing future benefits
within the retirement plan. There are other good economic arguments
for keeping the transfer system and the retirement system separate, but
that is not the focus of this paper. I would note however, that the
plan analyzed here would automatically handle much of the redistribution—27—
problemfor people in their retircment years if a proper transfer
system ware devised for people during their working years. Transfers
received and consumed during the working years willincreasefuture
retirement bonefits proportionately because the reuircd contributions
to the plan are proportional to consumption. Transfers intheform of
atotal or partial credit for the individual's required contribution
to his retirement account would work in a similar fashion, provided
that the cost of this transfer is not borne by the retirement plan itself.
ilaving reviewed the merits of a consumption—indexed pension plan,
I now turn to the issue of its feasibility. Although the idea of
investing accumulations in consumption-linked life annuities is new,
the basic structure of the, plan is simple and is essentially the smne
as a standard defined—contribution pension plan. It is therefore a
relatively easy plan to explain and understand. Its format also has the
attraction of "stability" in the sense that neither its basic structure
nor the parameters of the structure such as the contribution rate or the
period of accumulation would require much change over time even in the
face of significant variations in economic conditions. It does however
require that an appropriate measure for aggregate per capita consumption
be ehosen.-" To select the proper measure would require further study to
determine how consumer durable purchases should be treated and whether
or not to include items such as leisure time which are not normally
included in measures of consumption. There is also the issue of what
population neasure to use. While investigation of these issues is
surely beyond the scope of this paper, their resolution is as surely not—2 —
oninsurmountable problem. With this nicasuremrnt problem solved, there
doesnot appearto be any major difficulty with the government issuLnc
consumption—linked bondsand using their prices to determine the value
of consumption—linked life annuities.
The. main feasibility problems with a public plan as described here
are likely to be associated with the method of collecting the required
contributions and the maintenailce of the individual accumulation
accounts. While 1 have not investigated in detail the amount of computation
and record keeping required in the current Social Security system, it
appears that the amount required for individual account maintenance would
not be significantly larger for a consumption—linked plan. However, the
mechod of collection in such a plan is likely to be more difficult than
for current Social Security because the base is consumption rather than
income. As outlined, the plan requires that the amount of each contribution
be identifiable in the same way that individual federal income tax
payments are identified. Therefore, the method of collection necessary
for its implementation would probably be like that of the income tax
with consumption determined as the residual from a cash flow analysis.
The feasibility of such a collection system is currently a topic of
considerable discussion among economists principally in the context of
the feasibility of an individual expenditure tax (cf. Aaron and Boskin
(eds.) (1980) and Pechman (ed.) (1980)). Although a serious analysis
of feasibility will not be undertaken here, I would note that there is
an important difference between an expenditure tax and the mandatory
contribution part of a fully—funded retirement plan. Because it is a— •) U_
defined—contributionplan and accumulations earn a competitive rate,
cheating is less of •a problem to the extent that people treat contributions
as saving and not as a tax. Indeed, the rich, high—income, and well—
informed people who might be Lhought to have the greatest incentive and
opportunity to cheat on a tax are probably the most likely to view sucji
contributionsas saving, since these are the people who now voluntarily
enter into deferred compensation and Keogh plans. In general, those
who cheat on contributions are primarily cheating themselves. However,
one slight modification which might make the collection part of the plan
more effective would be to have withholding of the required contribution
based upon income as is currently the practice for Social Security, and
then to have refunds or additional contributions based upon the
computation of consumption made in conjunction with the filing of
federal income tax returns.
A more—radical modification of the plan as described here was
suggested to be by Lester Thurow of NIT. The collections for the plan
wouldbe done at the aggregate level by a value—added tax. The aggregate
amount collected would then be distributed as contributions to individua)
accumulationaccounts in proportion to the amount of income reported on
•the individuals federal tax return. The administrative benefits of
this modification depend upon the relative costs of collection for a VAT
versus a residual cash flow computation on the income tax return. It
does have the attractive feature that those who cheat by underreporting
income on their federal tax will lose some of their retirement benefits
(which they presumably paid for through the VAT). The principal--30—
disadvantageof this modification isthatthe aggregate contributions
willnow hetreatedas a consumotion tax which can distort the labor—
leisure decision. However, the credit to individual retirement accounts
based upon income will act as a subsidity to wage income which may
offset this distortion at least in part. This modification would
become considerably more attractive if the government chooses to use
a VAT to finance general government expenditures.
In summary, although the method of collecting contributions roses
the principal feasibility problem for such a public plan, a number of
different methods would seem to serve as close substitutes provided that
it remains essentially a defined—contribution plan which earns a fair
rate of return on accumulations and pays benefits indexed 1:o consumption.
If a policy decision were made to adopt a public pension plan with
a basic structure like the one analyzed here, there would still be the
further critical policy decision of what fraction of retirement period
consumption should be the target for the plan. Presumably, those who are
most concerned about the plan's success in dealing with information
cost and utility externalities would advocate a high fraction and those
who are most concerned about preserving individual choice would advocate
a low fraction. The correct policy decision will surely depend upon the
amount of other retirement saving that people are likely to make,
especially in housing andprivate pension plans. The resolution of this
policy issue, therefore, requires an ana].ysis of the overall pension
system. Since that was the note on which the paper began, it seems an
appropriate place for it to end.—31—
Footnotes
*Ajd from the National Bureau of Economic Research and the National
ScienceFoundation is gratefully acknowledged. Mythan1s to F. Black,
S. Fischer, D. Holland, L. Summers, and I.. Thurow for many helpful
discussions and toL.Sumrcrs for providing me;ith the datafor
Table 1. Any opinions expressed are mine andarenot necessarily
those of my helpful colleagues, NBER, or NSF.
1. On the matter of the assumed stability of H(t), I note that
because c(t;O) depends strongly upon the initial endowments of the
veryyoung, c(t;O)/c(t)is likely to be larger when the value of
humancapitalrelative to other factors of wealth is larger. It
alsoseems reasonable that the birth rate will be higher when the relative
economicvalue of children is high. However, if c(t;O)IC(t) <1,then
comparative statistics reveal that these two effects work in opposite
directionson H(t)in a stabilizing fashion.
2. Consumption data from US Department of Corraerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts of the United States,
Table 1.2. Noninstitutional Population Aged 16 and Over data from US
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
3.Fischer(1982) discusses a number of social benefits from the
government issuing wage—income—linked bonds, including possible
intergenerational risk sharing that private markets cannot provide.
Manyof the same benefits would come fromconsumption—linked bonds,and
indeed,if a consumption tax is less distorting than awage tax, then
the consumption—linked bonds may be superior.
4.It is, of course, not true thatevery model of lifetime consumption
choice will lead to an efficient allocation of retirement consumption
which depends only upon aggregate per capita consumption. For example,
Breedan's (1979) important theorems on this matter will not apply if
utility of consumptionisstate—dependent.
5. As I have shown elsewhere (1981), the distortion of the labor—
leisure decision of a consumption tax can be offset by linking future
retirementbenefitsto current wage income.— 32--
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